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DEATH OF A SALESMAN: THE RISE &
UNFORTUNATE POTENTIAL DEMISE OF
THE FULL-TIME LIFE INSURANCE
SALESMAN
ROBERT M. ROSH
I. BACKGROUND
Pity the poor life insurance salesman.' The "Father Knows
Best"2 era of the first half of the twentieth century where life
insurance sales was portrayed as a respected pursuit is long
over.3 There were, of course, exceptions to this popular culture
portrayal, such as Fred McMurray's co-conspirator role in
"Double Indemnity."4 Nevertheless, life insurance salesmen had
I Adjunct Professor of Insurance Law at St. John's University School of Law and
Vice-President & Deputy General Counsel at New York Life Insurance Company.
J.D., Columbia Law School, 1991; Ph.D., State University of New York, 1986; B.A.,
Clark University, 1982. The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of New York Life. The author would
like to thank Jessica Rosh, Guillermo Martinez, Crystal Venning, Jeffrey
Drummond, and his very own salesman, Bill Mahoney, for their invaluable help and
assistance.
I The profession remains overwhelmingly male, and I refer to people selling life
insurance as salesmen, not salespeople. See Robin Leidner, Serving Hamburgers and
Selling Insurance: Gender, Work, and Identity in Interactive Service Jobs, 5 GENDER
& SoC'y 154, 158, 161 (1991). For example, in 2010, there were a total of 163,814
affiliated agents of which twenty-two percent were female. MARGARET S. HONAN,
LIMRA, LIMRA'S CENSUS OF U.S. SALES PERSONNEL 23 (2010). The industry needs
more women and minority agents, including LGBT agents, because these
constituencies are particularly underserved.
2 See Father Knows Best, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0046600/ (last
visited Mar. 21, 2015). Jim Anderson, the main character, who was the wise
patriarch of a prototypical 1950s show, was a well-respected insurance salesman.
See Father Knows Best, MUSEUM OF BROADCAST COMM., http://www.museum.tv/
eotv/fatherknows.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2015).
' While far from an unambiguous public relations comeback, the portrayal of
agents in the movie "Cedar Rapids" was at least a step forward. CEDAR RAPIDS (Fox
Searchlight Pictures 2011).
4 DOUBLE INDEMNITY (Paramount Pictures 1944); see also FOOL COVERAGE
(Warner Bros. Pictures 1952) (Daffy Duck's role as the uninvited life insurance
salesman in the 1952 short is another exception).
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status and political clout, peaking in the 1950s, and were not the
general source of ridicule that they are in modern society and
somewhat more recent media, including films such as
"Groundhog Day" and "Take the Money and Run."5 Similarly,
the comment made by Chief Justice Holmes in 1911 that "life
insurance has become in our days one of the best recognized
forms of investment and self-compelled saving"6 no longer
applies. Financial "experts" now routinely advise people to buy
term and invest the difference, typically in no-load indexed
mutual funds or exchange traded funds ("ETFs").7 A modern
Frank Capra' would have a tough time with a no-load mutual
fund as plot device, but it would be highly unlikely for a modern
George Bailey9 to have his limited personal net worth tied up in a
whole life insurance policy. 10
A. Life Insurance Is a Tough Sale
Permanent life insurance is a tough sell under the best of
circumstances." As a general rule, people do not like discussing
their own mortality under any circumstances, never mind with a
salesman. 2 It is one of the few products on the market where the
5 GROUNDHOG DAY (Columbia Pictures 1993) (portraying an insurance
salesman as the most annoying person to bump into on the street); TAKE THE MONEY
AND RUN (Cinerama Releasing Corp. 1969) (Woody Allen's character is "tortured" by
being forced to spend time in solitary confinement with a life insurance salesman).
6 Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 156 (1911).
7 See, e.g., Suze Orman, Suze Orman's What-If Policy, 0, THE OPRAH MAG., Jan.
2004, at 27, available at http://www.oprah.com/money/Suze-Ormans-What-If-Policy
("[Tihe only type of life insurance that makes sense is term."); Understsanding
Affordable Term Life Insurance, NETQUOTE, http://www.netquote.com/life-
insurance/save/affordable-term-life-insurance.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2015)
("[F]or most people, the right type of life insurance can be summed up in a single
word: term.").
8 Director of the movie "It's a Wonderful Life." IT'S A WONDERFUL LIFE (RKO
Radio Pictures 1946). A whole life insurance policy is a major plot device-what
Director Alfred Hitchcock would call a MacGuffin-because the lead character
decides to commit suicide after the Bailey Building & Loan that he runs misplaces
depositors' monies and he is told that he is worth more dead than alive. Id.
9 Lead character in the movie "It's a Wonderful Life." Id.
'0 However, the Bailey Building & Loan might now decide to purchase a
significant amount of Bank Owned Life Insurance. Id.
"1 See GLENN S. DAILY, http://www.glenndaily.com/history.htm (last visited
Mar. 21, 2015), for comments of former New York Life CEO Sy Sternberg made in
2005.
"2 See id.; Karen Demasters, Life Insurance 'Conversation' Lacking, Survey
Says, FIN. ADVISOR (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.fa-mag.com/news/people-lack-life-
insurance-surevey-says--1 1946.html.
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people most interested in buying it-the unhealthy-are the
people whom the manufacturer does not want their sales people
to sell it to.13 The high loads to pay for high commissions,
charged in part because it is a tough sell that requires high
commissions, make whole life and other permanent forms of
insurance an even tougher sell in today's no-load environment. 14
Combine a tough product to sell with the low status of the person
doing the selling,1" and is it any wonder why the average age of a
life insurance salesman has increased dramatically, 16 as fewer
and fewer people get recruited into, and remain in, the
business? 7  Only the most resolute can stand that much
rejection.'8
But it gets worse. Life insurance salesmen have increasing
trouble even communicating with a prospect long enough to get
rejected. The National Do-Not-Call ("DNC") Registry became
13 But see generally Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets:
An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004).
14 The percentage of adults who own individual life insurance has declined from
fifty-nine percent in 1960 to thirty-six percent in 2010. JLM, The Decline of Life
Insurance, TRUST & WEALTH MGMT. MARKETING BLOG (Feb. 29, 2012, 9:43 PM),
http://trustmarketing.blogspot.com/2012/02/decline-of-life-insurance.html
[hereinafter JLM].
15 In October 2010, only thirteen percent of consumers indicated that they had
"an extreme amount" or quite a bit of confidence in insurance agents or brokers.
JENNIFER DOUGLAS ET AL., LIMRA, LIMRA CONSUMER SENTIMENT TRACKING
STUDY: OCTOBER 2010 UPDATE 6 (2010).
16 The median age of a life insurance agent is fifty-six, while the median age of
the U.S. worker is thirty-seven. Brian Anderson, Facing up to an Aging Producer
Workforce, LIFEHEALTHPRO (July 1, 2012), http://www.lifehealthpro.com2012/07/01/
facing-up-to-an-aging-producer-workforce.
17 The Great Recession has proved to be a boon to recruiting by mutual insurers,
but the number of life insurance agents affiliated with a specific company is still
down by nearly one-third since the 1970s. Fran Matso Lysiak, Sales Force: US
Mutual Life Insurers Work at Recruiting Career Agents, BEST'S REV. (Aug. 1, 2012),
available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Sales+force%3a+US+mutual+life+
insurers+work+at+recruiting+career+agents.-a0299257938. Geographically
dispersed agency forces are expensive to grow and maintain and do not necessarily
show immediate profitability. This is primarily why mutual insurers, which can be
focused on the long-term and not just quarterly results, are the only companies that
continue to focus on developing their own field forces. See id. This also helps to
explain why companies that have demutualized have turned to brokers and away
from a homegrown agency force.
18 The life insurance industry also did not do itself any favors in the late 1980s
and 1990s when it pushed the sales concept of "vanishing premiums" that proved
highly problematic as interest rates and, consequently, dividends declined. See, e.g.,
Gaidon v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 94 N.Y.2d 330, 342-43, 725 N.E.2d 598,
602-03, 704 N.Y.S.2d 177, 181-82 (1999).
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effective in October 2003,19 and includes hundreds of millions of
residential and wireless phone numbers.2 ° It severely limits the
ability of insurance agents to initiate a "cold call" solicitation of a
potential customer.2 Caller identification technology probably
does not help, either. Similarly, the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003
severely regulates unsolicited commercial emails.22 There are
even some municipalities, such as Claremont, California, that
have created "Do Not Knock" registries prohibiting insurance
salesmen from knocking on people's doors.2a
B. Coping Strategies
So what is a poor, disrespected, and dejected life insurance
salesman to do? First, they often ditch the label of "life insurance
salesman" by becoming registered representatives or financial
advisers after getting a Series 6 or Series 7 license from the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA").24 Second,
they often develop other outside business activities ("OBAs") that
can attract prospects to whom a life insurance salesman can
pitch life insurance. 25  There are, however, some inherent
problems with these two strategies.
19 Do Not Call List, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/do-not-call-list (last
visited Mar. 21, 2015).
20 FTC Issues The FY 2011 National Do Not Call Registry Data Book; Nearly
210 Million Phone Numbers on Do Not Call List, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Nov. 30,
2011), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/201 1/1 1/ftc-issues-fy-201 1-
national-do-not-call-registry-data-book-nearly.
21 Delivery Restrictions, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (2015).
22 See Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699; 15 U.S.C §§ 7701-7713 (2014); 16
C.F.R. § 316.1 (2015).
23 "Do Not Knock Registry"--New Ordinance, http://www.ci.claremont.ca.us/
download.cfm?ID=25364 (last visited Mar. 21, 2015). Perhaps the next limitation
will be based on the song by The Police titled "Don't Stand So Close to Me." THE
POLICE, Don't Stand So Close to Me, on ZENYATTA MONDATTA (A&M Records 1981).
24 See FINRA Rule 1031, available at httpJ/finra.complinet.com/en/
display/display.html?rbid=2403&record id=4260&elementjid=3584&highlight=regis
tration#r4260.
25 See Suzanne Barlyn, COMPLY-Why Moonlighting Brokers May Not Be a
Bright Idea, REUTERS, Aug. 8, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/08/08/brokers-moonlighting-idUSL2E8J359020120808. Getting great
leads has always been a risky proposition. See GLENGARRY GLEN ROSS (New Line
Cinema 1992) (real estate agents take desperate measures to get the good leads).
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1. The FINRA Risk
Many life insurance salesmen end up as registered
representatives of insurance affiliated broker-dealers that only
offer a limited range of products to customers, including
proprietary variable life and variable annuity products.26 FINRA
has historically looked with disfavor at variable annuity sales
and the life insurance salesmen who make them.27 One problem
that these agents often run into, because of the limited offerings
of their broker-dealers, is that when all you have is a hammer in
your toolbox, everything looks like a nail, and every need can be
filled by a variable annuity.
This problem has been exacerbated by FINRA's recent
expansion of its suitability rules,28 which impose obligations and
traps for the unwary on registered representatives if they sell a
security to fund a life insurance policy or use life insurance or
fixed annuities as part of an overall investment strategy.29 If a
uniform fiduciary duty is imposed on registered representatives
under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act,8" it may well be that life insurance agents who
are registered representatives will have a fiduciary duty imposed
on many-if not all-of their life insurance sales activities."1
26 See FINRA, REPORT ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 4, 29-30 (2013) [hereinafter
FINRA Report], available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/
@guide/documents/industry/p359971.pdf.
27 See SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N & NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, JOINT
SEC/NASD REPORT ON EXAMINATION FINDINGS REGARDING BROKER-DEALER SALES
OF VARIABLE INSURANCE PRODUCTS 2, 25 (2004) [hereinafter JOINT SEC/NASD
REPORT].
28 FINRA Notice 12-25, 2012 WL 1898671, at *1 (May 2012).
219 See id. at *1-2.
20 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
"' See Anderson, supra note 16. Increasingly, insurance salesmen start out in
their capacity as a registered investment advisor and provide a client with a
financial plan that includes life insurance. Currently, they can "switch hats" at
implementation when they sell a life policy to help with estate planning or sell a
mutual fund. Not allowing this in the context of a mutual fund sale or variable
universal life sale may be the first step in not allowing it in a fixed life sale.
Professor Joseph Belth notes that Chartered Life Underwriters ("CLU") have long
taken a "golden rule" pledge. Joseph M. Belth, No. 70: Fiduciary Standard of Care-
Rekindling the Debate, JOSEPH M. BELTH BLOG (Oct. 17, 2014),
http://www.josephmbelth.com/2014/10/no-70-fiduciary-standard-of.html?utm source
=feedburner&utmmedium=email&utm-campaign=Feed%3A+JosephMBelth+%28J
oseph+M.+Belth%29.
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This is a long way from the golden age of life insurance
salesmen, when it was assumed that all life insurance sales were
suitable and the only rule that applied was caveat emptor.2
Indeed, at least one life insurance agent has recently been
convicted of a felony for selling what was deemed an unsuitable
indexed annuity to a woman who allegedly suffered from
dementia.33  FINRA also requires firms to supervise their
registered representatives under a "reasonably designed"
supervisory system, 34 which leads to, among other things,
unannounced inspections and limits on client communications
including the use of texting and social media, such as Linkedln
and Facebook. 31 Agents often end up wishing that they had tied
themselves to their masts and not listened to the siren calls of
FINRA registration.
2. The OBA Risk
OBAs can open up life insurance agents to regulatory threats
and risky temptations.36 Some agents have been lured into
"selling away"-selling investments that are not authorized by
their broker-dealers, some of which, unfortunately, have turned
32 See Nick Ravo, CAVEAT EMPTOR; Buying Insurance To Pay Off a Mortgage:
Often No Bargain, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994104/
23/business/caveat-emptor-buying-insurance-to-pay-off-a-mortgage-often-no-
bargain.html.
33 Steven A. Morelli, Advisor Convicted of Theft for Selling an Annuity,
INSURANCENEWSNET (Feb. 29, 2012), http://insurancenewsnet.com/innarticle/2012/
02/29/advisor-convicted-of-theft-for-selling-an-annuity-a-
331872.html#.Uux7JXddW24. This conviction was later overturned by an appellate
court. People v. Neasham, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 146 (Ct. App. 2013).
34 See, e.g., NASD Notice 05-29, 2005 WL 894759, at *1, 3 (Apr. 2005).
35 See, e.g., FINRA Rule 2210(c)(1)(a) (2014), available at http://finra.complinet.
comlen/display/display-main.html?rbid=2403&elementid=10648. FINRA requires
firms to capture and supervise written communications. See FINRA Rule 2210(c)(6).
This requirement poses real challenges in a world where young people increasingly
text one another, and prefer not to speak on the phone. While new technologies
potentially allow agents to access their social media contacts, such as Facebook,
there are potential privacy concerns if an agent uses Facebook to determine which
contacts have had babies, bought new homes, and may be in need of additional life
insurance. See also ANNE OBERSTEADT ET AL., STATE OF THE LIFE INSURANCE
INDUSTRY: IMPLICATIONS OF INDUSTRY TRENDS 88-89 (Aug. 2013), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/cipr_home_130823_implications_
industry-trends-final.pdf.
36 See Barlyn, supra note 25.
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out to be Ponzi schemes." Others have gotten into significant
regulatory difficulties by simply failing to disclose and get
approval for their OBAs.3 8
Another threat from this two-prong business strategy,
although less immediate, is that spending too much time on
OBAs could undermine the very favorable tax status that many
life insurance career agents continue to enjoy as a vestige of their
political power during the golden age of life insurance sales.
Full-time life insurance salesmen are entitled to statutory
employee 39 status through their career companies. If they are
engaged on a full-time basis in the sale of life insurance and
annuities, they can be treated as employees for certain health
and welfare purposes and independent contractors for tax
purposes.4 ° Statutory employees can get the best of both worlds,
as discussed more fully below. If agents are too involved in
OBAs, it is possible that they will lose this favorable tax
treatment if the IRS concludes that they are not working for
their career companies "full-time." In their never-ending search
for potential prospects, career agents can, therefore, theoretically
jeopardize their extremely favorable tax status.
C. Marketplace Developments
Full-time life insurance agents, therefore, have to traverse a
regulatory path that is akin to Odysseus traveling between
Scylla and Charybdis. 41 Furthermore, they are now confronted
with young people who would rather shop and communicate on
the Internet42 or through texting and increasingly avoid phone
calls and face-to-face meetings. The face-to-face meetings that
life insurance salesmen would have in the early evening in
" See id.; Johnny Parker, Company Liability for a Life Insurance Agent's
Financial Abuse of an Elderly Client, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 683, 691-92 (2007).
38 See FINRA, Disciplinary Update (Summer Issue/Jun. 2005), available at
http://www.finra.org/industry/enforcement/disciplinaryactions/monthlyactions/
2005/pOl4271.
31 See 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 3121(d)(3)(B), 7701(a)(20) (West 2014).
40 See id. § 7701(a)(20).
41 See Between Scylla and Charybdis, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://www.
thefreedictionary.comlbetween+Scylla+and+Charybdis (last visited Mar. 22, 2015).
42 See Bill Coffin, Bridging the Mortality Protection Gap, LIFEHEALTHPRo (Sept.
13, 2013), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2013/09/03/bridging-the-mortality-protection
-gap.
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someone's suburban kitchen or dining room is facing extinction.43
Whole life insurance offered by mutual insurers and sold by full-
time life insurance agents has not yet gone the way of the VCR,
or worse, the Sony Betamax, but it is certainly not a cutting edge
Blu-ray player sold inexpensively through Amazon."
All these marketplace and regulatory changes are happening
just when Americans could most use someone sitting across their
kitchen table offering them a whole life insurance policy to,
among other things: (1) fund the special needs trust for their
autistic child, given the explosion of diagnosed rates of autism;
(2) supplement their meager savings while providing death
protection after their employer dropped their defined benefit
pension plan; or (3) provide LGBT partners with survival
benefits still denied to them by many states.
Some people may have bought term, but few have invested
the difference.45 Instead of redoing their kitchens to create a
center island, they could have benefitted from the forced savings
that the uncorrelated asset, whole life insurance, imposed.
Whole life insurance from a top-rated mutual insurer would have
also provided predictable dividends and long-term returns while
the stock market stagnated. Americans could also surely benefit
from a lifetime income annuity to replace the defined benefit
pension plan that their company likely eliminated, especially
since many of us are living longer.46 Most importantly, they
could benefit from some personal advice and hand-holding. One
recent study of Canadians determined that having a financial
advisor for fifteen years or more resulted in clients having, on
4 See Warren S. Hersch, LIMRA: Consumers Who Research Insurance Products
Online Increased by 60% Since 2006, LIFEHEALTHPRO (Oct. 11, 2011),
http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2012/10/1l1limra-consumers-who-research-insurance-
products-on. It is doubtful that a meeting through Skype will take its place.
4 It should be noted that DVDs may be made obsolete by video streaming.
Technological change stands still for no one, but interestingly, the Internet has not
been a significant source of life insurance sales, except for some younger consumers.
See OBERSTEADT ET AL., supra note 35, at 91-93. Google, Amazon, or some other
Internet giant may yet turn its attention to life insurance sales and make it work, at
least for term insurance.
45 See Warren S. Hersch, Coverage Gap Among Gen Xers Has Widened,
LIFEHEALTHPRO (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2013/09/13/coverage-
gap-among-gen-xers-has-widened; OBERSTEADT ET AL., supra note 35, at 45, 50.
46 See Dan Moisand, Economists Love 'Em, Clients Hate 'Em, FIN. ADVISOR (Feb.
1, 2012), http'//www.fa-mag.com/news/economists-love-em-clients-hate-em-9619.
html; James Crabtree, Older. But Wiser?, FIN. TIMES, July 23, 2011, at 1.
[Vol. 88:985
DEATH OF A SALESMAN
average, one hundred and seventy-three percent more assets
than clients who did not receive financial advice. 47  Most
brokerage and investment advisory firms are not interested in
middle-market clients. 4 They do not have the time to help these
middle-income clients deal with life's uncertainties, the "If in
Life" that the Metropolitan Life commercials so aptly identify.49
One continuing truth is that nothing is certain, other than
death and taxes, and a full-time life insurance salesman selling
permanent life insurance across a kitchen table to middle-income
Americans can help these families deal with both of these
certainties. However, these full-time life insurance salesmen are
in danger of disappearing from the scene just when they are
needed most, although they have not yet suffered the fate of
milk-men and Fuller Brush salesmen.0 Where have you gone,
Jim Anderson,51 or the legendary life insurance salesman, Frank
Nathan,52 on which the "Father Knows Best" character was
reportedly based? Our nation turns its lonely eyes to you.53
This Article traces the economic and regulatory rise and
potential future regulatory demise of the full-time life insurance
salesman. It outlines why these salesmen and many of the
products that they offer are beneficial to American society, and
why public policies should promote both the profession and the
47 CLAUDE MONTMARQUETTE & NATHALIE VIENNOT-BRIOT, CIRANO INSTITUTE,
ECONOMETRIC MODELS ON THE VALUE OF ADVICE OF A FINANCIAL ADVISOR 9 (2012),
available at https://web.archive.orgweb/20130508150303/http://www.cirano.qc.ca/
pdf/publication/2012RP-17.pdf.
48 See Coffin, supra note 42.
49 Michael Kristof, Famous Company Slogans: Collection of Famous Company
Solgans Advertising Taglines and Company Mottos, CLOSETFLIP, https://web.
archive.org/web/20140824090925/http://closetflip.wikispaces.comfile/view/famous-
company-slogans.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2015).
50 THE FULLER BRUSH MAN (Columbia Pictures 1948).
51 Selling Whole Life Insurance, CAREERBUILDER (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.
careerbuilder.com/Article/CB-2976-Insurance-Selling-whole-life-insurance/
[hereinafter CAREERBUILDER].
52 See Mary Anne Adler, Frank Nathan, CLU: The Huebner-Hollywood
Connection, WEALTH CHANNEL MAG., Spring 2014, at 88-89, available at
http://www.theamericancollege.edu/twc-interactive-magazine/spring-2014filest
assets/basic-html.
' This is not some angry post-2012 election rant about "taking our country
back." Rather, it is an acknowledgement that, perhaps ironically, a product and
process that reached its zenith in the 1950s could be of help in a diverse
multicultural twenty-first century.
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products sold by full-time life insurance salesmen. Finally, it
suggests some modest regulatory reforms that would promote life
insurance sales and the salesmen who make them.
II. THE GOLDEN YEARS OF LIFE INSURANCE SALESMEN
Opportunities are often born of crisis, and the aftermath of
the 1905 Armstrong Commission provided life insurance
salesmen with the opportunity of a political vacuum as the large
insurance companies retreated from the political scene.54 The
National Association of Life Underwriters ("NALU"-now known
as the National Association of Insurance and Financial
Advisors--"NAIFA") helped to fill this political vacuum with
extensive lobbying efforts that continually bore fruit.55 The
regulatory framework passed by New York state in 190656 and
other jurisdictions helped to create a predictable environment for
agents who now knew that it was illegal to rebate a portion of
their commissions, and who knew that their commissions and
compensation were closely regulated by the precursor to Section
4228 of the New York Insurance Law.5 The life insurance
industry was also required to seek more consistent and reliable
returns, because in 1906 New York State prohibited life
insurance companies from buying stock, from investment
banking, and from engaging in commercial banking."
A. Early Twentieth Century Expansion
The life insurance industry experienced tremendous growth
and expansion in the years following the Armstrong
Commission. 59 All servicemen in World War I received a $4,500
life insurance policy, and many sought to replicate this coverage
54 See generally MORTON KELLER, THE LIFE INSURANCE ENTERPRISE, 1885-1910:
A STUDY IN THE LIMITS OF CORPORATE POWER 253-57 (Belknap Press of Harvard
Univ. Press ed., 1963).
55 See generally GEORGE A. NORRIS, VOICES FROM THE FIELD (1989), available at
http://www.naifa.orgNAIFA/media/ExecutiveOffice/exec/NAIFA-VoicesFromTheFiel
d.pdf.
56 KELLER, supra note 54, at 257.
57 See Francine L. Semaya & Vanessa L. Sutter, There's No Place Like Home:
New York's Attempt To Keep Its Life Insurance Companies in New York, FORC Q. J.
INS. L. & REG. (1997), available at http://www.forc.org/pdfs/vol8-ed2-art5.pdf.
58 See generally Scheherazade S. Rehman, Can Financial Institutional Investors
Legally Safeguard American Stockholders?, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 683 (2006).
51 See KELLER, supra note 54, at 285-86; see also OBERSTEADT ET AL., supra
note 35, at 2.
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when they returned from the war.60 NALU was instrumental in
ensuring the tax-favored status of permanent life insurance,
pursuant to which the buildup of cash value and death benefits
are typically income tax free. 61 NALU also sought to promote the
professionalism of life insurance agents through education,
professional designations, and a focus on promoting full-time life
insurance salesmen.62  The American College of Life
Underwriters was founded in 1927, and developed the Chartered
Life Underwriter degree, which Wharton Professor Solomon S.
Huebner aided in establishing.63 Throughout the interwar period,
NALU was focused on promoting full-time, well-trained life
insurance agents and eliminating part-time agents who were
viewed as demeaning the profession.64 The Million Dollar Round
Table ("MDRT") was also instituted in 1927 for agents at the top
of their profession who had placed $1 million or more of life
insurance coverage in the previous twelve months.65
B. The Great Depression and World War II
The Great Depression placed strains on the life insurance
industry, like all sectors of the economy, as sales declined,
demands for policy loans increased, and expenses needed to be
drastically reduced.66 However, there was not the same run on
insurance companies as there was on banks. Indeed, while the
life insurance industry was scrutinized by the Temporary
National Economic Committee ("TNEC") beginning in 1938,68 the
60 See Sharon Ann Murphy, Life Insurance in the United States Through World
War I, EH.NET (Robert Whaples ed., Aug. 14, 2002), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/life-
insurance-in-the-united-states-through-world-war-i/. This pattern would be observed
again during and immediately after World War II, when servicemen became used to
having at least $10,000 in life insurance coverage. See NORRIS, supra note 56, at
142.
61 See generally 26 U.S.C. § 7702 (2012). See also NORRIS, supra note 55, at 67.
62 See NORRIS, supra note 55, at 49.
' See id. at 99-101.
6 Id. at 62.
65 About MDRT, MDRT, http://www.mdrt.org/aboutlindex.asp (last visited Mar.
22, 2015).
66 See NORRIS, supra note 55, at 112.
67 Id. at 119.
68 Katherine M. Jones, Law, Politics, and the Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Case of Insurance Regulation and the Commerce Clause, 1938-1948,
11 CONN. INS. L.J. 345, 370-71 (2005).
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TNEC concluded that the insurance industry was financially
sound and did not require federal regulation, despite its
concentration. 9
War always drives home the fragility of human existence
and reinforces the interdependence of families and communities.
The total war that was World War II uniquely underscored this
reality, both for the servicemen who appreciated the value of up
to $10,000 in life insurance that the U.S. government provided,
and for their families. 70  By January 1944, "total applications
form [sic] members of all branches of the armed forces for
National Service Life Insurance had topped the $100 billion
mark."71 This set the stage for a significant increase in demand
for private life insurance in the late 1940s and 1950s.
First, however, the insurance industry had to deal with the
curveball that the Supreme Court threw in its 1944 decision
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters,72  where it
overturned its 1869 decision in Paul v. Virginia, which held that
insurance was not commerce.7 3  The Court in South-Eastern
Underwriters held that not only did insurance constitute
commerce, but that it was interstate commerce that was subject
to Congressional regulation, including the antitrust laws. 4 This
decision threatened the status quo of state regulation of
insurance, and it mobilized the entire insurance industry,
including life insurance agents who enjoyed protection from
outside encroachment because of state licensing requirements.75
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners proposed,
and Congress promptly passed, the McCarran-Ferguson Act,76
with the primary intent to return the regulation of insurance
back to the states.77
69 Id. at 374.
70 NORRIS, supra note 55, at 112.
"' Id. at 152.
72 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
73 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868).
74 South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 549-50, 553.
75 S. REP. No. 78-1112, at 78 (1944).
76 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (2012).
77 S. REP. No. 78-1112, at 74.
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C. The 1950s: A High-Water Mark for Agents' Power and
Prestige
The 1950s were the high-water mark of life insurance agents'
political power and prestige. On August 28, 1950, achieving a
long-standing NALU agenda item, full-time life insurance agents
became eligible for Social Security benefits with the passage of
H.R. 6000.78 Full-time life insurance agents could be
characterized as statutory employees 9 under the Internal
Revenue Code rather than common law employees and could
enjoy the best of both worlds as independent contractors who are
entitled to employee benefits.8 0 Established agents for a career
company could, and still can, file a Schedule C as independent
contractors and deduct all of their reasonable business expenses
from dollar one. They are not required to file expenses on
Schedule A, which limits a common law employee's ability to
deduct expenses to only those expenses in excess of two percent
of adjusted gross income.8 ' These statutory employees, while
independent contractors for expense deduction purposes, also
enjoy most of the benefits associated with being a common law
employee. 2 For example: (1) they can participate in a number of
employee benefit plans, including health and welfare plans and
retirement plans; and (2) their insurer can pay the employer
portion of the FICA tax, and, consequently, these statutory
employees are not required to pay a self-employment tax even
though they get to deduct all of their expenses. 3 Insurance
companies try to be vigilant in ensuring that their agents are
full-time life insurance agents for them, but, as discussed below,
there is a great deal of pressure from agents to allow them to
participate in OBAs, both to diversify their income and to
generate leads.
71 NORRIS, supra note 55, at 173.
79 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 3121(d)(3)(B) (West 2014).
80 See id. §§ 3121(d)(3)(B), 7701(a)(20).
81 See AMT Adjustments, THE AMT ADVISOR, http://www.amtadvisor.com/AMT_
adjustments.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2015). This is especially the case if they are
subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax.
82 See Statutory Employees, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, http://www.irs.gov/
Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Statutory-Employees (last updated
Dec. 18, 2014).
83 See 1099: Employee vs. Independent Contractor, PAYCI-IEX (2012), available at
http://www.paychex.com/a/d/accounting(1099-employee-vs-independent-contractor.
pdf.
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III. THE RISE OF INTEREST RATES AND THE SEEDS OF
DESTRUCTION
The 1950s produced steady growth in life insurance sales
and were a golden age for life insurance agents.'I The percentage
of adult Americans who owned an individual life insurance policy
reached fifty-nine percent in 1960.5 Its subsequent decline to
thirty-six percent, fifty years later in 2010,6 is the story of the
decline of life insurance sales as a profession. American society
has not been well-served by this decline, as there was an
increasingly public assumption of the risk of premature death by
breadwinners.
A. Headwinds for Life Insurance Agents
The 1960s saw increasing returns from stocks and the
increasing popularity of mutual funds that outpaced the returns
that could be achieved through permanent life insurance.
Agents began to push their insurers to establish broker-dealers
so that they could sell mutual funds and insurers began to design
variable life and variable annuity products that included sub-
accounts that mirrored mutual funds.88
The economic turmoil that began in the 1970s created
headwinds for the life insurance industry and sowed the seeds for
a decline in the prestige of life insurance agents in the 1990s.
The rise of interest rates in the 1960s and 1970s, peaking in
19809, harmed insurance companies in a number of ways. First,
clients were able to take out low interest loans from their life
insurance policies and invest the monies in secure investments at
much higher returns, leading to a negative outflow of capital
84 But see Corey Dahl, The Not-So-Good Old Days, LIFEHEALTHPRO (Dec. 12,
2012), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2012/12/12/the-not-so-good-old-days.
85 JLM, supra note 14.
86 Id. See generally Note, Redefining Insurance: Distinguishing Between Life
Insurance and Investment Under Volatile Inflation, 91 YALE L.J. 1659 (1982)
[hereinafter Redefining Insurance].
87 OBERSTEADT ET AL., supra note 35, at 17-18; see also Redefining Insurance,
supra note 86, at 1665.
I" See Tamar Frankel, Variable Annuities, Variable Insurance and Separate
Accounts, 51 B.U. L. REV. 177, 179 (1971).
89 Interest Rates & Inflation: 1900-2013; An Inconsistent Relationship Before the
Liberating 1960s, CRESTMONT RES., http://www.crestmontresearch.con/docs/i-rate-
relationship.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2015).
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from insurers.90 Second, insurance portfolio rates changed slowly
so that whole life insurance became less competitive as interest
rates rose because insurers had invested in long term debt at
lower, now less competitive, rates.91 As interest rates rose in the
1970s, insurance companies began increasingly to offer universal
life and variable life insurance that could illustrate market rates
of returns.92  Third, selling variable life policies required
insurance agents to become registered representatives of the
National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD," now FINRA)
in order to sell these products.93 Additionally, insurance agents
wanted to be able to sell mutual funds, which also required a
securities license. 4 Insurance agents' efforts to get securities
licenses had unexpected subsequent consequences, as discussed
below, in terms of their supervision. Finally, insurance agents
were often encouraged to replace older whole life policies, which
had lower returns because of the older portfolio of underlying
investments, with new money universal life policies using the
current higher interest rate assumptions.
IV. THE LONG SLOW DECLINE OF BOTH INTEREST RATES AND
AGENTS' STATUS
After interest rates peaked in 1980, life insurance companies
had the wind at their back for the next 30 years as rates
gradually decreased over time.96 This made their products,
particularly whole life, more competitive over the long haul.
However, it did create some long-term issues for insurers and
agents, who were illustrating permanent life insurance policies
90 See John Hancock Financial Services, Inc.-Company Profile, Information,
Business Description, History, Background Information on John Hancock Financial
Services, Inc., REFERENCE FOR BUS., http:/www.referenceforbusiness.com/history2/
95/John-Hancock-Financial-Services-Inc.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2015).
91 See Frank J. Rief, III, Life Insurance Time Bombs, SC35 ALI-ABA 81, 87
(1998).
92 See Redefining Insurance, supra note 86, at 1661.
93 See FINRA Rule 1031, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/
display.html?rbid=2403&recordid=4260&element id=3584&highlight=registration
#r4260.
94 Id.
" Douglas C. Doll, A Brief History of Universal Life, UNIVERSAL LIFE STUDY
NOTE, 1999, at 112; see also Law of Commercial Agents and Brokers § 8:13 (West
2014).
" See Interest Rates & Inflation: 1900-2013; An Inconsistent Relationship Before
the Liberating 1960s, supra note 89.
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under current rates, even as those rates continued to decline
along with the dividends being paid by mutual insurance
97companies.
A. Class Action Lawsuits
Mutual insurance companies had developed, and insurance
agents had run with, the concept of "vanishing premiums," which
would allow dividends, and the paid-up insurance that those
dividends could purchase, to pay for whole life policies after a few
years.9 These illustrations, which agents began to run on their
personal computers in the late 1980s and early 1990s, relied on
current dividend scales to show out of pocket premiums going
away after only a few years of payments. 99 As interest rates and,
correspondingly, dividend rates, began to decline, policies failed
to go on premium offset, and thousands of lawsuits, including a
number of class actions, were filed in the 1990s. 1°° Similarly,
universal policies were being minimally funded based on
projections of high interest rates on the illustrations provided,
and as interest rates declined, policyholders found that the
higher mortality rates charged in later years began to soak up
the limited cash value accumulated, resulting in the self-
destruction of these policies.' 01
B. Stretching the Concept of Insurable Interest
Another problematic trend was that the concept of insurable
interest 10 2 began to stretch in the 1980s, with the aggressive
marketing of corporate-owned life insurance ("COLI") and bank-
owned life insurance ("BOLI"), for organizations to insure the
lives of "rank-and-file employees."' 3 While the COLIIBOLI
97 OBERSTEADT ET AL., supra note 35, at 18.
98 See Gaidon v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 94 N.Y.2d 330, 339, 725 N.E.2d
598, 600, 704 N.Y.S.2d 177, 179 (1999).
9 See, e.g., id.
100 See id. at 343, 725 N.E.2d at 603, 704 N.Y.S.2d at 182.
101 See Darla Mercado, Resurgence Ahead for Life Settlements Industry?,
INVESTMENT NEWS (Dec. 16, 2013, 2:09 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/
article/20131216/FREE/131219929.
102 Long a mainstay of the life insurance industry, requiring an interest born of
either love and affection or economic dependence. See Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S.
149, 155 (1911).
103 High current crediting and dividend rates combined with favorable tax
treatment made these policies attractive to businesses. See Susan Lorde Martin,
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market created sales opportunities for some high end life
insurance agents, overall, the loosening of insurable interest ties
since the 1980s has had a deleterious effect on the industry and
on the status of life insurance agents. 104 In the wake of the AIDS
crisis, viatical settlement companies began to purchase the life
insurance policies at a discount, taking advantage of the need to
pay for the expensive treatment and maintenance of patients.0 5
When medical advances allowed AIDS patients to live long and
productive lives, harming the returns that Life Settlement
Companies hoped to achieve, this industry pivoted to buying the
existing policies of the elderly, which were deemed actuarially
more valuable, especially since these policies could be packaged
as non-correlated investments. 10 6 Finally, this morphed into
Investor or Stranger Owned Life Insurance ("STOLI"), where
unrelated parties would be the impetus behind the elderly
purchasing large life insurance policies on their own lives and
quickly assigning them to the individuals paying the premiums
in return for a cash payment or a free death benefit.'0 7 All this
unseemly activity tarnished the life industry and life insurance
agents, making sales and market penetration ever more
challenging. 0
C. The Low Water Mark of the 1990s and Early 2000s
The mid-1990s was perhaps the low water mark for market
conduct issues related to life insurance agents and the life
insurance industry.'0 9 Companies were caught up in a New York
Betting on the Lives of Strangers: Life Settlements, STOLZ, and Securitization, 13 U.
PA. J. Bus. L. 173, 178 (2010).
... Id. at 188.
105 Id. at 174.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 187. One ongoing industry concern is that the focus of life insurance as
an investment undermines the rationale for the favorable tax status that life
insurance policies enjoy. If life insurance were just another investment, there would
be no rationale for a tax-free inside buildup. The significant societal good that vast
majority of life insurance sales help to foster-protecting families from financial
difficulty or devastation-is an important public good that justifies the favorable tax
treatment.
108 Id. at 188.
109 See Joseph B. Treaster, Three States Investigating Sales Practices of Met Life,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 1997), http'//www.nytimes.com/1997/11/07/business/three-
states-investigating-sales-practices-of-met-life.html. However, the life insurance
industry as a whole was highly profitable due to the growth of the annuity business.
See OBERSTEADT ET AL., supra note 35, at 7.
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state market conduct examination focused on agents who
misrepresented insurance as a retirement plan.1 ' Plaintiff class
action securities lawyers turned their attention to agent sales
practice litigation involving the premium offset sales concept."'
And individual agents were caught up in allegations of
churning' 12 or creating or marketing Ponzi schemes.1 3 Declining
interest rates exacerbated these problems, as did the
technological innovation of the personal computer and printer
that allowed agents to develop their own marketing materials
and communicate them via email to clients.
1 4
The specter of competition from banks also hung in the air,
thanks to the Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Barnett Bank v.
Nelson" ' and the passage of the Federal Financial Services
Modernization Act of 1999, otherwise referred to as the Gramm-
Leach-Blilely Act." 6 However, bank cross-selling of life insurance
has never really taken off and is not the primary threat facing
life insurance salesmen.17
The early 2000s were not much better, as some agents got
caught up in selling promissory notes that were either fraudulent
or constituted the sale of securities not approved by their broker-
11 See Loguidice v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 2003); James
Martinez, Metlife Offers Refunds Amid Accusations Over Sales Tactics, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Oct. 6, 1993), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1993/ MetLife-Offers-Refunds-
Amid-Accusations-Over-Sales-Tactics/id-23658a9206822b7e47f8eefa0f734238.
1 See Insurance Litigation, MILBERG LLP (2015), http://www.milberg.comI
insurancelitigation/.
112 See Treaster, supra note 109.
113 See, e.g., Soranno v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., No. 96 C 7882, 1999 WL 104403, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 1999).
114 See OBERSTEADT ET AL., supra note 35, at 92; Policies Of Deception?,
BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 16, 1994), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/
1994-01-16/policies-of-deception.
11" 517 U.S. 25, 28 (1996).
116 Summary of Federal Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act), N.D. LEG. COUNCIL STAFF FOR FAM. LAW COMM. (2001),
http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/57-2001/docs/pdf/39150.pdf.
117 See Eric R. Baron, Why Banks' Cross-Selling Falls Short, THE BARON GROUP,
INC., https://web.archive.org/web/20120105074209/http://www.barongroup.con/imag
es/Why Bank.sCrpss-SellingFallsShort.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2015). Bank
sales of annuities, however, have grown tremendously as an alternative channel for
insurers, but this distribution system has its own share of regulatory issues. See,
e.g., Dorothy Hinchcliff, FINRA Fines Bank B-Ds For Variable Annuity Sales, FIN.
ADVISOR (Jul. 23, 2009), http://www.fa-mag.com/news/finra-fines-bank-b-ds-for-
variable-annuity-sales-4272.html.
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dealers. 118 Investor desperation, born of two bear markets and
decreasing interest rates, provided the opportunity for
unscrupulous insurance agents to take advantage of clients,
especially elderly clients.119 The elderly are particularly trusting
of individuals who have designations promoting their expertise,
and numerous life insurance agents sought "drive-by"
designations that required little study and no continuing
education in an effort to promote their legitimacy.
20
V. THE REGULATORS STRIKE BACK
The National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"-
now renamed FINRA) increased its focus on life insurance
salesmen in the late 1990s, particularly on the suitability of
variable annuity sales made by these life insurance salesmen.
12
'
The NASD Notice to Members (99-35) set forth product specific
suitability responsibilities when an insurance agent, who also
needs to be licensed as a registered representative, recommended
a variable annuity to a customer. 22
A. Variable Annuity Suitability
Most suitability requirements are general, but when selling
a variable annuity, the broker-dealer and the agent or registered
representative were specifically directed to obtain comprehensive
customer information, including the customer's occupation,
marital status, age, number of dependents, investment
objectives, risk tolerance, tax status, previous investment
experience, liquid net worth, other investments savings, and
annual income.123  Registered representatives were also
instructed to discuss all relevant facts with the customer
regarding the specific terms of the variable annuity, including
118 See Johnny Parker, Company Liability for a Life Insurance Agent's Financial
Abuse of an Elderly Client, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 683, 693-94 (2007).
119 See id. at 687-88.
120 See State Warns Consumers About 'Senior Specialists', DEP'T OF CONSUMER
BUS. & SERVICE 1 (March 2006), available at http://www.cbs.state.or.us/dfcs/news
releases/2006/senior_specialist-release.pdf.
121 See Clifford E. Kirsch, Redefining the Retail Relationship: The Emerging
Regulatory Framework Governing Suitability, The Standard of Care and Disclosure,
ST006 ALI-ABA 775, 779-86 (2011).
122 See NASD Notice to Members 99-35 (May 1999), available at
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p004395.pdf.
123 See id. at 230.
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liquidity issues such as potential surrender charges and IRS
penalties, fees, and market risk. 124 Ironically, one of the features
of a variable annuity that the NASD and then FINRA objected to
was the costs associated with riders guaranteeing the premium
from market loss over a long, that is, ten-year period, because
market losses had not, with the possible exception of the Great
Depression, been previously experienced over this long a time-
period. However, the long decline of the stock-market in the
early twenty-first century has made those riders so valuable that
many insurers have lost significant amounts of money on this
business.'25
The proposing release for FINRA's variable annuity sales
practice rule, NASD Rule 2821, now known as FINRA Rule 2330,
explained that it was the complexity of variable annuities and
FINRA's uncovering of "questionable sales practices" that led this
Self-Regulatory Organization to issue NTM 99-35.126 As noted
above, while FINRA has adopted suitability rules that govern the
sale of all securities products, FINRA Rule 2330 is one of only a
very few rules that deal with the suitability of a specific
securities product. Rule 2330 requires that a member or person
associated with a member recommending a purchase or exchange
of a variable annuity have a reasonable basis to believe: (1) "the
customer has been informed, in general terms, of various
features of deferred variable annuities;" (2) "the customer would
benefit from certain features of deferred variable annuities, such
as tax-deferred growth, annuitization, 121 or a death or living
benefit;" and (3) "the particular variable annuity as a whole, the
underlying subaccounts to which funds are allocated at the time
of the purchase or exchange of the deferred variable annuity, and
riders and similar product enhancements ... are suitable.' 28
124 See id.
125 See Leslie Scism, Misjudged Annuity Guarantees May Cost Life Insurers
Billions, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBI0001
424127887323998604578565711321338272.
126 Kirsch, supra note 121, at 786.
127 Banks have had more success selling fixed and variable annuities. See
OBERSTEADT ET AL., supra note 35, at 18-19.
128 FINRA Rule 2330(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii), available at http://finra.complinet.
con/en/display/displaysviewall.html?rbid=2403%20&elementid=3643&print=1.
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The registered representative recommending the purchase of a
variable annuity must document these considerations and sign
this documentation. 129
Rule 2330, in conjunction with FINRA's new general
suitability requirements codified in Rule 2111, makes the sale of
variable annuities by life insurance salesmen potentially fraught
with peril. Pursuant to Rule 2111, FINRA has outlined three
separate components of suitability: (1) reasonable-basis
suitability; (2) customer-specific suitability; and (3) quantitative
suitability.13 ° Rule 2111's focus on quantitative suitability may
be the most problematic for insurance agents who only have a
limited number of tools in their toolbox because it focuses firms
and FINRA on sales of multiple annuities to the same customer.
The sale of annuities generally results in higher commissions
compared to the sale of mutual funds, and insurance agents
generally favor annuities as a differentiator that cannot be sold
by a registered representative who does not have an insurance
license. 131 This can sometimes result in the overconcentration of
a client's assets in annuities, which FINRA views more like
disfavored mutual fund Class B shares with higher expenses and
backend loads than the more favored Class A shares that have a
load but have lower expenses. 132
B. Fixed Annuity Suitability
Fixed annuities, although not regulated by FINRA, have also
been subject to increasing governmental regulation. The
National Association of Insurance Commissioners began to focus
on annuity suitability in the 1990s, especially in light of the
Dingell report, 3  and published a white paper on suitability. 3 1
Initially, the focus was on the suitability of sales to seniors, but a
129 Kirsch, supra note 121, at 788.
130 See id. at 781.
131 See JOINT SEC/NASD REPORT, supra note 27, at 2.
1,2 See NASD Files Enforcement Actions Involving Unsuitable Sales of Mutual
Funds, NASD (Aug. 12, 2003), http://www.finra.orgfNewsroon/NewsReleases/2003/
P002885.
13' The Dingell Report, named after the investigating committee's chair, Rep.
John D. Dingell, D-MI, accused "state insurance regulators for lacking adequate
resources, using unreliable financial information, failing to coordinate, and
performing infrequent examinations." OBERSTEADT ET AL., supra note 35, at 21
(internal quotation marks omitted).
134 Kirsch, supra note 121, at 789-91.
2014] 1005
ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW
model suitability act that applied to all clients was revised in
2006.11 A majority of states have now adopted this model act. 136
It requires an insurance producer to have reasonable grounds to
believe that the fixed or variable annuity is suitable for the
consumer based on the consumer's financial status, tax status,
and investment objectives. 137 An insurer is required either to
ensure that a producer has a reasonable suitability review
system or to develop such a reasonable suitability system itself,
which is required if the insurer has career agents.13' A four hour
training requirement was added in 2010.13' A primary focus of
both state regulators and FINRA has been equity indexed
annuities.14 ° These annuities are complex products that seek to
increase potential returns by tying them to a market index but
come with complex caps, high surrender costs, and high
commissions that have led to problematic sales practices.'
VI. THE HOBGOBLIN OF LITTLE MINDS 142
Crisis leads to regulation and is the primary impetus of
regulatory change. The Great Recession of 2008 was no
exception to this rule. The near total economic meltdown that
impacted homeowners and investors alike in 2008 sent a
shockwave through America's economic system. 143 The largest
Ponzi scheme in history also unraveled because as the tide went
out, all could see that Bernie Madoff and his investment advisory
135 Sandy Praeger, Kansas Ins. Comm'r and NAIC President-Elect, Testimony of
Sandy Praeger Before the Senate Select Committee on Aging (Sept. 5, 2007)
[hereinafter Praeger], available at http://www.naic.org/documents/testimony-0710-
praeger.pdf.
136 See id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 See Kim O'Brien, Annuity Facts: How Will the New NAIC Suitability Model
Affect Education and Training in 2011?, LIFEHEALTHPRO (Nov. 2, 2010),
http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2010/11/02/annuity-facts-how-will-the-new-naic-suit
ability-mo.
140 See OBERSTEADT ET AL., supra note 35, at 33-34.
141 See id.
142 See Ralph Waldo Emerson, Familiar Quotations, BARTLEBY.COM, http://
www.bartleby.com/100/420.47.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2015).
143 See generally Dimitris Christelis et al., Wealth Shocks, Unemployment
Shocks and Consumption in the Wake of the Great Recession (Ctr. for Studies in
Econ. and Fin., Working Paper No. 279, 2014), available at http://www.csef.it/WP/
wp279.pdf.
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firm were figuratively swimming naked.' The fact that Madoff's
investment advisory firm, which assumed a fiduciary duty
towards its clients, had committed the fraud and not his broker-
dealer, who had no such fiduciary duty but was closely regulated
by FINRA, did not give legislators or regulators pause that a
uniform fiduciary duty would not cure what ailed the industry.145
A. The Rand Study of Differentiated Regulatory Regimes
Instead, regulators and the securities industry refocused on
a 2008 study by the RAND Corporation.'46  RAND was
commissioned by the Securities and Exchange Commission to
study clients' understanding of the business practices of their
broker-dealers and investment advisers, and in particular
whether clients understood the distinctions between the duties
owed to them depending on which type of financial adviser they
chose to do business with.147 Business models had long since
converged as broker-dealers had begun offering fee-based
brokerage platforms and investment advisers had begun offering
asset under management wrap programs.1 48  Despite this
business model convergence, broker-dealers and investment
advisers continued to be regulated by two different federal
statutes-the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("34 Act")149 and
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ("IAA").' 50 This resulted in
two highly differentiated regulatory regimes.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the RAND Report concluded that
clients were confused by the duties owed to them by their
144 See The Swimming Naked Awards, ECONOMIST (Dec. 16, 2008),
http://www.economist.com/node/12796770.
145 See Kate McBride, Six Choice Pieces of Fiduciary Misinformation,
THINKADvISOR (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2010/03/18/six-choice-
pieces-of-fiduciary-misinformation.
146 See generally ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY
PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISORS AND BROKER-DEALERS, RAND INSTITUTE
FOR CIVIL JUSTICE (2008) [hereinafter RAND STUDY], available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical-reports/TR556.html.
141 Id. at xiii-xiv.
14 See, e.g., Recommendation of the Investor as Purchaser Subcommittee Broker-
Dealer Fiduciary Duty, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-
committee-2012/fiduciary-duty-recommendation.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
149 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (2014).
150 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80b-1-21 (2012)).
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financial advisers.' What the RAND Report also concluded, and
what was typically overlooked by those pushing new regulations,
is that despite this confusion, most clients were happy with the
advice and service that they received from their financial
professionals.152
Insurance agents are potentially subject to three, not merely
two, separate and distinct duties of care when dealing with
clients. First, when selling fixed insurance and annuities as an
insurance agent, they are subject to state suitability laws. 3
Second, when selling variable life and variable annuities, they
are subject to both the state insurance laws and FINRA's
suitability rules. 54  Finally, if they act as Investor Adviser
Representatives ("IARs") of a Registered Investment Adviser
("RIA"), they are subject, pursuant to the Supreme Court's
decision in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau,'55 to a fiduciary duty whereby they are
required to disclose conflicts of interest by providing clients with
their firm's Form ADV-Part II that sets forth these potential
conflicts. 5 '
B. Dodd-Frank's Efforts at Harmonization
In the wake of the Great Recession and the Madoff Ponzi
scheme, the Obama Administration proposed the Investor
Protection Act of 2009,151 which, after significant revisions, was
signed into law as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010.158 One of the key provisions of
Dodd-Frank was Section 913, which authorized the SEC to
conduct a study on the standards of care applicable to broker-
151 RAND STUDY, supra note 146, at xix.
152 Id.
153 See THOMAS R. SULLIVAN & ADAM HAMM, LIFE INSURANCE & ANNUITIES
COMMITTEE, SUITABILITY IN ANNUITY TRANSACTIONS MODEL REGULATION, available
at www.naic.org/documents/committees a suitability-reg-guidance.pdf.
154 See, e.g., FINRA Rule 2330(a)(1), available at http://fmra.complinet.
comlen/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record id=14663&elementid=8824&highli
ght=2330#r14663.
155 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
156 See id. at 191-92; Uniform Application for Investment Adviser Registration,
OMB No. 3235-0049, Part II, available at http://www.sec.gov/abouttforms/formadv-
part2.pdf.
"I Investor Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 3817, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
158 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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dealers and investment advisers and related issues.'59 Dodd-
Frank also authorized the SEC, after conducting this study, to
promulgate rules imposing a uniform fiduciary duty on broker-
dealers and investment advisers when providing investment
advice to retail customers.16 ° Section 913 was a much watered-
down version of the initial Obama vision of a uniform fiduciary
duty of care whereby broker-dealers and RIAs would have been
required to act solely in the customer's interest "without regard"
to any interest of the firm's. 161 This proposed fiduciary standard
of care is much more akin to that imposed on a guardian or
trustee, as opposed to the disclosure-based regime that meets the
fiduciary obligations of an RIA under the Investment Adviser Act
of 1940.16'
The Obama fiduciary duty standard would have been
unworkable in a capitalist society, because even one's mother
does not act solely in her child's best interest "without regard" to
any interest she might have. By contrast, most firms believe that
they can live with the fiduciary duty imposed by the Investors
Advisers Act of 1940, which essentially requires disclosures of
conflicts of interest, not the abolition of all conflicts of interest. 163
It was this disclosure-based regime that the SEC was authorized
to create after studying the issue." The provision adds further
restrictions on any fiduciary duty created by the SEC that were
crucial to insurance companies. Specifically, Section 913 also
directs the SEC that any standard of care developed: (1) shall not
prohibit commission or compensation based commission
159 Dodd-Frank Act § 913(b)(1).
160 Kirsch, supra note 121, at 55.
161 See Investor Protection Act of 2009 § 103(f)(1).
162 See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, 84 Stat. 1433 (1940) (codified
as 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1-21 (2012)).
163 Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 require an
adviser to make full and adequate disclosure to clients on matters that may affect
the adviser's independence and judgment. See id. ch. 686, sec. 206(1)-(2). Section
206 is intended to bring conflicts of interest to the attention of clients to permit fully
informed decisions regarding the adviser. See id. There is a great deal of confusion
about what constitutes a fiduciary duty because there is more than one potential
definition. The Advisers Act sets forth a disclosure regime. Some news reports set
forth a misimpression that it sets forth a guardian-like standard that might require
the sale of the cheapest product, which is not the case. See, e.g, Tara Siegel Bernard,
Before the Advice, Check out the Adviser, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/12/business/mutfund/before-the-advice-check-out-
the-adviser.html.
14 See Dodd-Frank Act § 913.
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transactions; (2) shall not require a continuing duty of care or
loyalty to the customer after providing the personalized
investment advice; and (3) the standard of care shall not prohibit
the sale of proprietary or limited range products. 165  For
insurance affiliated registered representatives who sell only
proprietary variable annuities for a commission as part of a "one
and done" sale, these limitations were absolutely necessary to
allow these representatives to continue with business as usual
under enhanced disclosure. 166
1. The SEC Study Authorized by Dodd-Frank
In January 2011, the SEC released its study on the
effectiveness of legal and regulatory standards of care for broker-
dealers and investment advisors called for under Section 913 of
the Dodd-Frank Act. 167  The study makes two primary
recommendations: (1) the SEC should "engage in rulemaking
specifying a uniform fiduciary standard of conduct that is no less
stringent than currently applied to investment advisers that
would apply to broker-dealers and investment advisers when
they provide personalized advice about securities to retail
customers," and (2) the "regulatory protections related to
personalized investment advice about securities to retail
customers provided by broker-dealers and investment advisers
should be harmonized to the extent that harmonization appears
likely to add meaningful investor protection.'
68
The study was not well-received; most notably, two SEC
commissioners concluded that the study failed to show that a
uniform standard would enhance investor protection. 169  They
asked for a more rigorous analysis rooted in economics and
data.170 Various House Republicans picked up on this criticism
165 Id. § 913(k)(1).
16 See Matt Zagula, Are You a One-And-Done Closer Or a Client Advocate?
(June 2010), http://insurancenewsnetmagazine.com/article/are-you-a-one-and-done-
closer-or-a-client-advocate- 1460.
167 See generally SEC, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS:
As REQUIRED BY SECTION 913 OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (2011), available at http'/lwww.sec.gov/news/studies/
2011/913studyfinal.pdf.
166 Kirsch, supra note 121, at 816.
169 Proceedings of the 2011 Midwest Securities Law Institute Symposium, 12 J.
Bus. & SEC. L. 99, 249 (2012).
170 Id.
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and disparaged the SEC study for its lack of factual data and its
failure to conduct a meaningful cost-benefit analysis of a
fiduciary duty.171 These criticisms were particularly troubling in
light of the D.C. Circuit's decision in Business Roundtable v.
Securities and Exchange Commission,72 where the court found
that the "Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously for
having failed ... adequately to assess the economic effects of a
new rule."173
2. The Subsequent SEC Data Request
On March 1, 2013, in response to these criticisms, the SEC
published a request for data and other information to assist it in
considering whether to make new rules about the standards of
conduct and regulatory obligations for broker-dealers and
investment advisers when they provide personalized investment
advice about securities to retail customers. 74  The SEC stated
that it was most interested in
quantitative and qualitative data ... about the benefits and
costs of the current standards of conduct of broker-dealers and
investment advisers when providing advice to retail customers,
as well as alternative approaches to the standards of conduct,
including a uniform fiduciary standard of conduct applicable to
all investment advisers and broker-dealers when providing
personalized investment advice to retail customers.
175
The SEC's data request was very complex and lengthy. 76 It
is doubtful that firms, clients, or trade associations provided the
type of data that the SEC needs to conduct a valid cost-benefit
analysis. The data request also contained a red herring for
insurance companies and agents. As part of the assumptions of
what a fiduciary duty would look like, respondents to the data
request were instructed to assume that "[t]he rule would prohibit
the receipt or payment of non-cash compensation (e.g., trips and
prizes) in connection with the provision of personalized
investment advice about the purchase of securities.' 1 77  Most
171 Id.
172 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
173 Id. at 1148 (citations omitted).
174 Duties of Brokers, Dealers, and Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 34-69013, 78 Fed. Reg. 14,848, 14,848 (Mar. 7, 2013).
171 Id. at 14,851.
176 See generally id.
177 Id. at 14,857.
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insurers have annual meetings for their top producers, and the
ability to hold these meetings is codified by New York Insurance
Law. 78  It is an opportunity for these beleaguered souls to
socialize with their peers, celebrate their sales accomplishments
together, and learn about their career companies' new products
and initiatives. Pursuant to FINRA's rules on non-cash
compensation for variable products, all products, both
proprietary and non-proprietary, must count equally as part of a
total sales accomplishment, and there can be no sales contest tied
to the sale of one individual product.'79 Given FINRA's rules and
the SEC's other stated assumptions that conflicts need not be
eliminated but can be disclosed, it is very curious that the SEC
has chosen this one specific conflict of interest as the one that
seemingly cannot be disclosed away. Certainly, differentiated
cash compensation might pose a greater conflict than non-cash
compensation. Furthermore, if trips were unavailable for the
sale of securities products, they would remain available for the
sale of fixed insurance products that are not regulated by the
SEC.180  This would create a conflict of interest where none
previously existed. Trips for insurance salesmen are ingrained
into the culture of life insurance companies. 81 It is certainly
seen as a morale booster for individuals working in the life
insurance industry.
C. The Department of Labor Inserts Itself into the Discussion
The Department of Labor ("DOL") also inserted itself into
the discussion of fiduciary duty in the context of insurance sales.
In October of 2010, the DOL proposed a revision of its rules
resulting in the imposition of a strict fiduciary duty in the
context of 401(k) rollovers, which is the source of significant
funds for variable annuities. i 2 While Individual Retirement
Accounts ("IRAs") are covered by ERISA-like rules and
regulations, advice concerning a potential IRA rollover to a fixed
178 N.Y. INS. LAW § 4228(e)(7) (McKinney 2014).
179 FINRA Rule 2320(g)(4)(d)(ii), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/
display/display-viewall.html?rbid=2403&element id=8494&filtered-tag=.
180 See N.Y. INS. LAW § 4228(e)(7) (authorizing insurers to hold conventions and
conferences).
181 The movie "Cedar Rapids" explores the longing for camaraderie at one such
agent conference. See CEDAR RAPIDS, supra note 3.
182 Definition of the Term "Fiduciary," 75 Fed. Reg. 65,263, 65,270-72 (Oct. 22,
2010).
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or variable annuity is currently deemed a purchase
recommendation and not an investment related
recommendation. 183  Consequently, no ERISA fiduciary duty
currently applies when a registered representative suggests that
a 401(k) participant consider a rollover to an annuity. 8 4 This
allows, for example, a broker-dealer to pay its registered
representative a commission for an IRA rollover.
Only suitability rules currently apply to rollovers. However,
under the DOL's 2010 proposal, registered representatives who
provided advice in the context of a 401(k) rollover to an IRA
would be fiduciaries unless they were willing to provide
prospective clients with disclosure that their interests were
adverse and that they were not providing impartial investment
advice.8 5 Few financial services firms and fewer registered
representatives would want to provide such disclosure to their
clients.
Application of ERISA fiduciary rules would be problematic if
applied to annuity rollover sales, because ERISA's fiduciary
requirements are much stricter than the Investment Advisor's
Act disclosure regime, and generally require fiduciaries to act as
prudent experts would, and solely in the interest of plan
participants to the exclusion of all other interests or concerns.1 8 6
This is a guardian or trustee-like standard."8 7 Without specific
exemptions, which were not set forth as part of the DOL's rule
proposal and are, therefore, not guaranteed, neither registered
representatives nor their broker-dealers could have any conflicts
of interest.18 There could only be a flat fee for advice, no
commissions, and variable annuities sold in the rollover market
could not include proprietary sub-accounts. 8 9  While this
proposal was subsequently withdrawn, the DOL was expected to
propose a revised fiduciary duty rule in January 2015.19° Unless
"" See FRED REISH, PURSUING ROLLOVERS IN AN EVOLVING REGULATORY
LANDSCAPE 4 (2013), available at http://www.napa-net.org/Portals/I/PDFs/Partners/
Pursuing-Rollovers-in-an-Evolving-Regulatory-Landscape-.pdf.
184 See id.
' See id. at 5.
186 See id. at 3.
'8 See id. at 7-8.
186 See id. at 4.
188 See id.
190 DOL To Delay Fiduciary Redraft Release Until January, THINKADVISOR
(May 27, 2014), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2014/05/27/dol-to-delay-fiduciary-
redraft-release-until-janua. The proposal has been delayed further in the wake of a
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the proposed rule is substantially reworked, it would clearly
revolutionize the rollover process and might deny middle-class
clients access to financial advice.
D. FINRA Seeks To Cover the Gap
Regulators abhor a vacuum, and the failure of both the SEC
and the DOL to act has provided FINRA with the daylight to
promulgate its own instructions to registered representatives and
broker-dealers;' 9 ' and this guidance brings sales of securities
through broker-dealers closer to a fiduciary regime on the
disclosure end of the spectrum, but with a few potentially
troubling twists for insurance affiliated broker-dealers. In
October 2013, FINRA released its "Report on Conflicts of
Interest," and while the report was not intended to create any
new legal requirements, FINRA's stated expectation was that
firms consider the practices presented in the report and
implement appropriate changes. 192 FINRA also cautioned that if
broker-dealers do not make adequate progress on conflicts
management, it will evaluate whether rulemaking related to
conflicts would enhance investor protection. 193
FINRA recommended that firms adopt a "best-interest-of-
the-customer" standard in each firm's code of conduct.'94 FINRA
also advised firms to look beyond minimum disclosure
obligations. FINRA suggested that firms evaluate the
effectiveness of their disclosure by asking, "in the event of a
reasonably foreseeable adverse product outcome, could an
investor legitimately say, 'I did not realize that could happen' on
the basis of information the firm provided apart from the
prospectus.'1 95  A best-interest-of-the-customer standard
combined with fulsome disclosure of conflicts is the equivalent of
leaked White House memo that very negatively evaluated the brokerage industry,
accusing it of providing conflicted and expensive advice, particularly in the IRA
rollover context. See Melanie Waddell, White House Memo Offers a Peek at DOL
Fiduciary Strategy, LIFEHEALTHPRO (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/
2015/01/26/white-house-memo-offers-a-peek-at-dol-fiduciary-st.
'9' See FINRA Report, supra note 26, at 1.
192 Id. at 2.
193 Id.
'9' Id. at 9.
191 Id. at 13.
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the potential fiduciary duty standard set forth in Section 913 of
Dodd-Frank. 19
6
FINRA, however problematically for insurance affiliated
broker-dealers, goes even farther than Dodd-Frank by suggesting
that firms involved in both the manufacture and distribution of
products "maintain effective safeguards to alleviate pressure to
prefer proprietary products to the detriment of customers'
interests." '197 In general, FINRA is promoting open architecture
for both mutual funds and VAs198 and a neutral distribution
grid' 99, whereas Dodd-Frank specifically recognizes that some
firms may only allow their registered representatives to sell
proprietary products.2 0  This recognition in Dodd-Frank is
particularly important to insurance companies, which may only
allow their registered representatives to sell proprietary variable
annuities, both because it helps pay for a geographically diverse
distribution force and because it is difficult to evaluate the
suitability of hundreds of variable annuities.
FINRA's report also specifically focused on IRA rollovers.
FINRA specifically instructed firms to enhance their supervision
and surveillance of a registered representative's
recommendations around "key liquidity events" in an investor's
lifecycle, most particularly when an investor rolls over her
401(k)." 1  FINRA notes that "[t]he recommendations a
representative makes at this stage of an investor's life have
profound implications for the investor and deserve thorough
scrutiny and review."202
FINRA followed up in December 2013 with Regulatory
Notice 13-45 entitled "Rollovers to Individual Retirement
Accounts."20 3 FINRA notes that there is an inherent conflict of
interest when a registered representative recommends that a
client roll over their 401(k) because a commission will not be
196 See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No 111-203, § 913(g), 124 Stat. 1376, 1828-29
(2010).
197 FINRA Report, supra note 26, at 3.
198 See id. at 24.
199 See id. at 27-28.
200 See Dodd-Frank Act § 913(k)(2).
201 FINRA Report, supra note 26, at 31.
202 Id. at 4.
203 FINRA, Regulatory Notice 13-45, Rollovers to Individual Retirement
Accounts (2013), available at http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Notice
Document/p418695.pdf.
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earned if the recommendation is that the client should keep his
or her funds in a former employer's 401(k) plan.20 4  FINRA
therefore cautions both broker-dealers and their registered
representatives to deal fairly with potential clients by comparing
the advantages and disadvantages of remaining in their former
employer's 401(k) plan or investing their money with the firm the
registered representative is associated with.205
FINRA will likely particularly focus on 401(k) rollovers into
variable annuities, which can have higher fees than employer
sponsored plans. Insurers and their affiliated broker-dealers will
need to demonstrate that the insurance features of the variable
annuity recommended provide a real benefit to customers.
Consequently, increasing the focus on products that allow
annuity owners to convert funds within the annuity to
guaranteed monthly payments or guaranteed death benefits will
go a long way towards defending their suitability in the context
of a 401(k) rollover.
VII. A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY REGULATORY REGIME FOR
TWENTIETH CENTURY PRODUCTS
Regulating to the lowest common denominator in order to
deter bad actors is never a winning proposition. If a bad actor is
determined to commit fraud, a standard of conduct will not stand
in the way. It was Madoffs Investment Advisory firm that owed
clients a fiduciary duty that defrauded clients, not Madoff's
broker-dealer, which arguably operated under a less stringent
standard.0 6 As discussed above, there are insurance salesmen
who are bad actors, and there need to be significant consequences
for these bad acts, including license revocation and jail time.
One answer is for the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners to create a nationwide database, similar to
FINRA's BrokerCheck database, which would serve as a uniform
depository of information on agent terminations and customer
complaints. This would allow both the public and insurers to
avoid bad apples.
204 See id. at 4.
211 See id. at 4-5.
206 See McBride, supra note 145.
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A. The Need for Pragmatic Regulation To Promote Market
Penetration
The answer, however, is not to place unrealistic regulatory
obstacles in the path of the vast majority of insurance
professionals who are trying to make suitable sales and generally
trying to do right by their clients. One example of an easy
solution is for FINRA to exclude text messaging that is merely
administrative in nature-that is, "I'm running ten minutes
late," or "Can we meet next week to discuss?"-from the rules
requiring firm capture and supervision. Texting is likely
happening in any event, and so it is putting the compliant at a
disadvantage, especially insurance agents in detached locations,
who, unlike wire-house registered representatives, are still
making house-calls. °7
More fundamentally, a guardian-like fiduciary standard
cannot work in a commercial society where there will always be
conflicts. A geographically dispersed sales force, which many
mutual insurers in particular have nurtured, is expensive to
maintain and supervise, and the costs of this field force
necessitate the focus of proprietary products to justify the
expenses associated with a detached agent meeting in someone's
kitchen in, say, Lincoln, Nebraska.
There is no academic study that I am aware of indicating
that Americans own too much term or permanent life
insurance 08 and, similarly, there is no study indicating that
Americans own too many lifetime immediate annuities. Both
products serve a public interest in that the private assets
distributed reduce reliance on public assets and assistance.
Defined benefit pensions for employees in the private sector have
almost disappeared, and both permanent life insurance and
immediate annuities can help to fill that void. Contingent
deferred annuities are also starting to help fill this gap.209 Whole
207 Technology may end up solving this problem, as firms like Global Relay race
to capture text messages in a FINRA-compliant format. See generally GLOBAL
RELAY, http://www.globalrelay.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2015).
208 There are many so-called financial experts who make the argument. See, e.g.,
Dave Ramsey, The Truth About Life Insurance, DAVERAMSEY.COM (Oct. 25, 2010),
http://www.daveramsey.com/article/the-truth-aboutlife-insurance/.
209 Contingent deferred annuities only begin to pay an individual if and when
they reach a set age. This allows for greater annual payments once they begin. See
Contingent Deferred Annuities, NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMMISSIONERS, http://www.
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life insurance is, for example, a non-correlated asset that
performed well compared to the S&P 500 in the first decade of
the twenty-first century210 and is more likely to be available to a
widow or widower than to other comparable assets. Immediate
lifetime annuities are also a non-correlated asset that can help
ensure that individuals insure against a longevity risk that they
outlive their assets.211 When combined creatively with securities
investments, immediate annuities can help ensure a secure
retirement.212
Studies using Monte Carlo simulations have suggested that
an immediate annuity may be better than a portfolio of bonds to
ensure against longevity risks.1 3 Consequently, public policy
should promote the distribution of well-designed immediate
annuities and permanent life insurance policies. Immediate
annuities and life insurance policies that are straightforward,
relatively transparent, and market tested should have a
presumption of suitability and appropriateness. Deferred
annuities with these same characteristics and with valuable
riders should at least have the presumption of suitability and not
be assumed to be problematic. A start would be to subject plain
vanilla variable annuities only to FINRA's general suitability
standard.
Regulators need to shed their passive aggressiveness and
just be aggressive with respect to products and sales practices
that they deem unsuitable. If indexed annuities or indexed life
insurance policies are too complicated,1 4 the answer is not to
subject all fixed products to a strict suitability review; rather, the
answer is targeted regulation or targeted prohibitions directed at
the offending products. Moreover, there should be a regulatory
predisposition toward permanent life insurance and immediate
naic.org/cipr topics/topic-contingent deferredannuities.htm (last updated Feb. 26,
2015).
210 See CAREERBUILDER, supra note 51.
211 See Walter Updegrave, How a Lifetime Income Annuity Works, CNNMONEY,
(Mar. 6, 2013), http://cached.newslookup.com/cached.php?refid=102&siteid=951&id
=1544421&t=1362569205.
212 See id.
212 Kelly Greene, Say Goodbye to the 4% Rule, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 3, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 100014241278873241623045783044914925596
84.
214 See Investor Alerts: Equity-Indexed Annuities-A Complex Choice, FINRA,
http/www.finra.org/Investors/ProtectYourself/InvestorAlerts/AnnuitiesAndlnsuran
ce (last updated Sept. 13, 2010).
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lifetime annuities. Market competition amongst insurers is the
best defense against uncompetitive product features, costs, and
designs. Overly burdensome regulations, including a fiduciary
duty for fixed insurance products, might create more
transparency, but it would do so at the cost of market
penetration, because it would drive up compliance costs and
potentially lead to an open architectural structure that is
incompatible with a geographically dispersed career field force.
It is this geographically dispersed field force that targets the
middle market of Americans who might otherwise go without
financial advice. That the advice is coming from someone trying
to sell them a suitable product, and not someone who has their
sole interest in mind, does not diminish the importance of access
to suitable advice and to suitable products.
B. The Car Salesmen Analogy
Insurance salesmen do not like being compared to car
salesmen.215 However, both sell products that are essential to the
public and whose suitable design and performance are crucial to
protecting the well-being and security of the consumers
purchasing these products. Furthermore, some analogies
between the sales of the two products can be useful. A person
walking into a Ford Dealership should not expect the sales
person to sing the praises of Hondas or Chryslers.216 See revised
footnote. Similarly, a customer dealing with a Northwestern
Mutual sales person is not likely to hear how great a New York
Life or Mass Mutual product is. This should come as no surprise,
and, if it does, no amount of paternalistic regulation can save
such consumers from themselves.
If car dealerships and car salesmen had to act in the
customers' best interest, without regard to any interest they
might have and with no conflicts, distribution penetration would
likely decrease and distribution costs would likely increase.
Perhaps the car buying experience would be fairer, although
consumers might be overwhelmed by choice, and it is not always
clear what constitutes their best interest. That is, what if they
215 The reverse probably also holds true.
216 Absent "A Miracle on 34' Street," where Kris Kringle recommended that a
potential customer of Macy's go to Gimbels instead because Gimbels had a better
deal on the product she wanted. A MIRACLE ON 34 T STREET (2 0th Century Fox 1947).
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want to pay extra for a Lexus when a Toyota is more practical?
Similarly, it is not clear that every life sale needs to be set forth
on a spreadsheet, and that there is not some real value from
buying a slightly more expensive policy from an insurer with a
higher rating. There needs to be some personal responsibility on
the part of consumers to understand the products they are
purchasing, and if that lack of understanding is the result of a
misrepresentation or a fraud, then there are both statutory and
common law remedies available to consumers.
Insurers and their regulators need to guard against bad
actors. Even if an insurer's field force is Ivory Snow pure,217
there would still be fifty-six bad actors in a field force of ten
thousand, which is a fairly typical size for larger career force
companies. There is no question that some insurers have done
themselves no favors by not always weeding out bad apples who
have oversold, over-promised, or over-committed to unsuitable
products and unsuitable sales. 218 Nevertheless, the fundamental
truth is that life insurance salesmen are selling products that
help ensure the security of American families. Their demise
would harm American families and American society. Both
mortality risks and longevity risks would further shift from a
private concern to a public concern. At the risk of sounding
Capraesque,219 life insurance agents are an American institution
and sell products that deserve regulatory support.
CONCLUSION
My grandfather repeatedly told me when I was a young man
that the secret to life was "to take everything in moderation."
Many have been given that advice, but in this age of polarized
217 Ivory Snow, PROCTER & GAMBLE, https://www.pg.com/enCA/product-card/
hhivorysnow.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2015).
218 See State Securities Cops: Senior Investors Facing a Perfect Storm for
Investment Fraud, N. AM. SEC. ADM'RS AssoC. (Sept. 4, 2003), http'J/www.nasaa.org/
7975/state-securities-cops-senior-investors-facing-a-perfect-storm-for-investment-
fraud./. Consequently, I understand and respect Professor Joseph Belth's counter-
argument that traditional life and annuity sales should fall under a fiduciary duty
standard. See Belth, supra note 31. We simply reach different conclusions about how
to best respond to these problematic practices while balancing market penetration
concerns.
219 Capraesque, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/
capraesque (last visited Mar. 26, 2015) (referring to the movies of director Frank
Capra, whose movies promoted the acts of ordinary people as heroic when they
helped people achieve the American Dream).
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politics and polarized economics, where Cadillac commercials
now pay tribute to unabashed conspicuous consumption at the
expense of other values,22 ° few are heeding it. In the context of
life insurance sales, this advice leads me to the conclusion that
an under-regulated life insurance and annuity marketplace that
led to an over concentration of these products would be just as
problematic as an over-regulated marketplace that led to
underpenetration of life and annuity products.
Permanent life insurance and immediate annuities can,
when combined with other financial products, play an important
role in protecting middle-class families and keeping them from
solely having to rely on government programs. Pragmatic
regulation of life insurance and annuity sales that flexibly
responded to technological and sociological changes would help
swing the pendulum back to the middle, allowing life insurance
salesmen to greater penetrate what is currently an underserved
market. By contrast, ever stricter suitability rules, especially for
straightforward products, regulating agent conduct based on the
lowest common denominator, or the imposition of a fiduciary
duty to fixed product sales, while well-intentioned, would result
in ever decreasing market penetration. The American Middle
Class would live and die poorer as a result.
220 Carolyn Gregoire, Cadillac Made a Commercial About the American Dream,
and It's A Nightmare, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.huffington
post.com/2014/02/26/this-commercial-sums-up-en_4859040.html.
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